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seems to believe that the state courts should be required to fur-
nish the protection guaranteed the witness by the Fifth Amend-
ment.
Whichever interpretation of the Mills case is correct, it seems
clear that the satisfactory disposition of the problems required
more than a per curiam opinion. The result of the case, in the
light of the dissenting opinions and the silence of the majority,
has been to increase the uncertainty in this area. Some explana-
tion by the Court would have resulted in the assurance that wit-
nesses relying on their privilege against self-incrimination would
be able to make decisions based on settled law rather than ques-
tionable assumptions.
Jack Pierce Brook
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
CLARIFIED WITH REGARD TO CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Petitioner was convicted of contempt of Congress1 for refus-
ing to answer questions of the House Un-American Activities
Committee relating to Communist methods of infiltration into
the field of education. 2 Petitioner was present when the subject
under inquiry was read by committee counsel. 3 He also heard
testimony of an earlier witness to the effect that petitioner had
been a member of a Communist club while a graduate student in
college. After answering several introductory questions relating
to his background, petitioner refused to answer five questions4
concerning his political associations, acquaintances, and member-
1. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1938) : "Every person who having been summoned as a
witness by the authority of either house of Congress to give testimony or to
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint
committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of
Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, wilfully makes default,
or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of
not more than $1,000, nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for
not less than one month nor more than twelve months."
2. The printed report of this committee appears as: House Comm. on Un-
American Activities, "Communist Methoas of Infiltration (Education-Part 9)
H.R. Doc. 30172, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 5754 (1954). (Hereinafter cited as 1954
Hearings).
3. "The field covered will be in the main communism in education and the
experiences and background in the party by Francis X. T. Crowley.
"It will deal with activities in Michigan, Boston, and in some small degree,
New York." 1954 Hearings 5754. See note 2, supra.
4. "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?
"Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?
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ships in various organizations. Petitioner's brief was admitted
in evidence and asserted that the committee lacked authority to
inquire into his associations and beliefs as they were protected
by the First Amendment and that the activities of the committee
constituted a bill of attainder which is prohibited by the Constitu-
tion.5 In the subsequent contempt proceedings he also urged that
the authorizing resolution6 of the committee was so vague as to
deny him due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment and that he was not sufficiently apprised of the pertinency
of the questions to the matter under inquiry. 7 After his convic-
tion was affirmed by the court of appeals," petitioner applied to
the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment
and remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration
in the light of its recent decision in Watkins v. United States.9
On remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed its previous de-
cision.10 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed, four Justices dissenting."' The First Amendment does
"Now you have stated that you knew Francis Crowley. Did you know Francis
Crowley as a member of the Communist Party?
"Were you ever a member of the Haldane Club of the Communist Party while
at the University of Michigan?
"Were you a member while a student of the University of Michigan Council
of Arts, Sciences, and Professions?" Id. at 5804-5812.
5. Petitioner was refused permission to read the lengthy statement into the
record; however, the brief itself was admitted. 1954 Hearings 5807, note 2 supra,
contains the full contents of the brief.
6. "(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcom-
mittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent,
character, and objects of Un-American propaganda activities in the United States,(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa-
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any neces-
sary remedial legislation." H. Res. 5, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 18
(1953).
7. This requirement is specifically set forth in the statute authorizing contempt
proceedings which is quoted in note 1, supra.
8. Barrenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
9. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
10. Barrenblatt v. United States, 252 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
11. The dissenting Justices, Black, Warren, and Douglas, would have upheld
all of petitioner's claims. They felt that the wording of the authorizing resolution,
with especial reference to the phrases "un-American activities" and "un-American
propaganda" is so vague as to deny any witness appearing before the committee
due proces of law under the Fifth Amendment. Justice Black's position in regard
to petitioner's First Amendment claims has been clear for years. He believes that
the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment are absolute and there can be no
governmental interference.
The dissent would further hold that the activities of the committee constitute
a bill of attainder within the meaning of the Constitution, their position being
that any public or private opprobrium which results from forced disclosure of
unpopular beliefs is a form of punishment, and if Congress indulges in such ex-
posures, the courts ought to prevent it. To support their feeling that the com-
mittee is indulging in such activities, they attached a lengthy appendix to their
opinion which contained statements of various members of the committee to the
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not protect a person who refuses to reveal his political associa-
tions before a congressional committee investigating an area in
which the Congress is competent to legislate. The authorizing
resolution of the House Un-American Activities Committee is
sufficiently clear to afford the witness an opportunity to make
an informed decision as to the bertinency of questions asked by
the committee. The exposure that attends the activities of the
committee does not constitute a bill of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution. 12  Barrenblctt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959).
In order to appreciate the significance of the instant case an
understanding of the due process problems created by congres-
sional investigative committees is necessary. The power of Con-
gress to investigate is subject to several limitations. 18 Congress
has no general investigative power enabling it to require dis-
closure of private affairs. 14 However, in an area in which Con-
gress has a valid legislative interest, there can be investigations
which will require the disclosure of private affairs, associations,
effect that exposure was part of their job. However, it is to be noted that the
majority of the Court is not willing to examine the individual motives of the com-
mitteemen, but rather presume that if the committee is performing a valid legisla-
tive function, the motives of the members of the committee are not subject tojudicial scrutinizing. They feel that if this power is being abused it is up to the
electorate to correct the situation at the polls.
Justice Brennan would have reversed the conviction solely on the grounds that
the questioning of petitioner was exposure for exposure's sake, and that petitioner's
First Amendment rights cannot be subordinated for this purpose.
12. Cf. Lovett v. United States, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), where an act of Con-
gress prohibiting the payment of salaries to certain named government employees
on the basis of information that they were "security risks" was held to constitute
a legislative punishment and to fall within the constitutional prohibition against
bills of attainder.
13. The power of Congress to investigate is limited by the grant of power to
it in the Constitution. It cannot investigate those matters upon which it is not
authorized to legislate, nor can it investigate private affairs unrelated to a valid
legislative purpose. Kilborne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Further, the bill
of rights restricts the power of Congress to investigate. The Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause has been held as a legal limit on the power of Congress
to compel testimony in investigations. Starkovich v. United States, 231 F.2d 411
(9th Cir. 1956) ; Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Marcello
v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Costello, 198
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.
Ohio 1952); United States v. Livacoli, 102 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ohio 1952);
United States v. Cohen, 101 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Calif. 1952) ; United States v.
Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191 (Crim. Div. D.C. 1951) ; United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96
F. Supp. 491 (D.C.D.C. 1951) ; United States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495 (D.C.D.C.
1951) ; United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 (D. Hawaii 1950).
14. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927) ("Neither House is
invested with 'general' power to inquire into the private affairs and to eompel
disclosures") ; Kilborne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) ("Neither of these
bodies [the Houses of Congress] possess the general power of making inquiry into
the private affairs of the citizen"). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
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and beliefs.-' Once such an area is selected, a committee is au-
thorized by resolution to conduct an investigation. This resolu-
tion sets forth the scope of inquiry and delineates the area in
which witnesses can be compelled to answer questions. The wit-
ness is bound to interpret this resolution at his own risk.16 It
must be drawn so as to enable the witness to make a rational
choice as to whether a particular question is "pertinent to the
matter under inquiry,' 7 this being the test embodied in the con-
tempt statute which provides criminal sanctions for those who
refuse to answer. If the resolution is too vague, a witness before
the committee would be without a standard by which to deter-
mine whether he is about to commit a criminal act. This would
result in a denial of due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
ment.18
Prior to the instant case, the latest and controlling authority
on the protection which the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause afforded witnesses appearing before congressional investi-
gative committees was Watkins v. United States.19 In reversing
a contempt conviction of a witness who refused to answer ques-
tions regarding ex-Communist acquaintances, the court in Wat-
kins set forth the following standards to which it would look in
appraising the pertinency of the question posed: (1) the author-
izing resolution of the committee, (2) the opening remarks of
the committee chairman, (3) the remarks of the members of the
committee, (4) the response of the chairman to a direct challenge
on pertinency grounds, and (5) the nature of the proceedings
themselves. If any of these factors sufficiently inform the wit-
ness of the pertinency of the questions asked, the contempt con-
viction would be sustained. However, in looking to each of these
factors in the Watkins case, the Court found that the questions
asked were not pertinent. Moreover, since the Court severely
criticized the authorizing resolution of the House Un-American
15. Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82
(2d Cir. 1947) ; National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146
(D.C. D.C. 1948). See also American Communications Ass'n' v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950).
16. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. A typical statement of this proposition is found in Jordan v. DeGeorge,
341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) : "This Court has repeatedly stated that criminal statutes
which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done
are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law." Scull v. Virginia, 359
U.S. 344 (1959) ; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
19. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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Activities Committee, it was believed that the effect of the case
would be to restrict that committee's activities.
It is believed that the most significant aspect of the instant
case is the apparent change which it reflects in the attitude of
the Court toward the authorizing resolution of the House Un-
American Activities Committee.2 0  This change is partially re-
flected by the fact that the Court, while acknowledging that the
authorizing resolution is subject to differing interpretations, was
willing to examine it in the light of the "legislative gloss"' 21 placed
on it by Congress, rather than restricting its examination to the
language of the resolution itself. After specifically holding that
the resolution was clear enough to meet the requirements of the
due process clause, the Court then examined the other factors set
forth in the Watkins case. It was found that in the instant case
petitioner heard the charging of the committee and the remarks
of the chairman and committee members. Also, the Court consid-
ered the fact that he had been present when a prior witness iden-
tified him as a member of a Communist club. It is interesting
that the majority also noted his complete refusal to cooperate
with the committee. On the basis of these facts, the Court found
that he had been apprised of the pertinency of the questions
asked him as to the matter under inquiry, thus satisfying the
requirements of due process.
20. It is to be noted that in Watkins the majority Justices were Warren, Black,
Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, and Justice Frankfurter rendered a concurring opinion.
Justice Clark dissented. Justices Burton and Whittaker took no part in the de-
cision. In the instant case the majority Justices were Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
Whittaker, and Stewart. The minority were split, Justices Warren, Black, and
Douglas joining in one opinion and Justice Brennan writing a third opinion. From
an examination and comparison of the opinions in these two cases it becomes ap-
parent that the new majority, formed out of the switching of Justice Frankfurter
and the addition of Justice Stewart to the Bench, has a far different opinion of
the House Un-American Activities Committee's work, its resolution, and the func-
tion of the Court in this area than do the minority, who retained their previous
position, as expressed in Watkins. The new majority is obviously willing to read
the resolution in the most favorable light possible, ignore as beyond the scope of
judicial notice the exposure that goes along with the activities of the committee,
and to preclude inquiry into the motives of the congressmen who are conducting
these investigations.
The minority is unwilling to do any of these things, feeling that any of them
in itself is sufficient grounds for reversal. While it is conceded that the two
cases can be distinguished on factual grounds, it appears that in this case and
several others concerning the right of investigation of so-called subversive activi-
ties, the Court has swung back over to the position of allowing the federal and
state governments a high degree of latitude in their conduct. See Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). But see Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
21. This term as used by the Court here seems to mean the entire legislative
history of the statute, including debates before its enactment, in committee and
on the floor of both Houses of Congress, the reports of the committee, its sub-
sequent proceedings, extensions, and changes in status.
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In dealing with petitioner's First Amendment contention, the
Court, while recognizing that this amendment protects the in-
dividual's right to freedom in his associations, again affirmed
the doctrine that this protection is not absolute.22 When Congress
decides that the interest of the nation requires an individual to
reveal his political associations, and the area under investigation
does not fall outside the power of Congress to legislate, the only
constitutional requirements are (1) a valid legislative nexus be-
tween the information desired and a possible legislative program
of Congress, 28 and (2) a showing that the interests of the nation
outweigh the interests of the particular individual in remaining
silent.24 The majority, in determining that the first requirement
had been met, took notice of the prior legislation dealing with
the Communist Party in the United States. It then concluded
that the latter requirement had been shown, noting the current
efforts of the Communist Party in the world. The right of the
nation to preserve itself from this menace overbalanced the right
of an individual to conceal his allegiance to the Communist
Party.25
It was suggested earlier in this Note that the importance of
the instant case rests on its clarifying and narrowing effect on
the implications of the Watkins decision. Although the Watkins
case cast doubt upon the adequacy of the resolution authorizing
the Un-American Activities Committee, the Court in this case
clearly established the validity of that resolution. Of further in-
terest is the feeling, which can be seen in this decision, that the
22. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) and West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) were cited by the
court for the proposition set forth in the text. Accord, Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown Corporation Counsel, 354
U.S. 436 (1957) ; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ; Terminello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ; Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
23. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957) : "The critical element
is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress
in demanding disclosure from an unwilling witness." See also American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). In regard to the right of the states
to compel disclosures in this area, see Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959);
National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
24. National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 165
(D.C. D.C. 1948).
25. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). The power to control
the activities of those who advocate the violent overthrow of the government,
which includes the right to identify them, rests on the right of self-preservation,




right of anonymous political association is not protected from
governmental invasion to the same degree as the rights of free
speech and belief.
Robert S. Cooper, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT OP STATES TO
INVESTIGATE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Appellant, an officer of a New Hampshire corporation which
operated a summer camp, was summoned by the State Attorney
General' to testify in regard to certain alleged subversive ac-
tivities. Appellant answered all questions regarding his own
activities, but refused to produce a list of names of persons who
had attended the last two sessions of the camp. After refusing to
comply with a state court order to produce the lists, which was
issued pursuant to a motion by the Attorney General, appellant
was held in civil contempt and confined to jail until he should
see fit to comply with the order. The sentence was affirmed by
the State Supreme Court.2 Appellant's defenses were: (1) that
the state statute authorizing the investigation had been ren-
dered null by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson3 which held that the field of subversion
had been occupied by federal legislation to the exclusion of the
states; and (2) that the state was precluded from compelling the
disclosure by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. On the first appeal to the United States Supreme Court,4
appellant was successful in obtaining a remand of the case for
reconsideration in the light of the Court's recent decision in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.5 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
reaffirmed its previous decision.6 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting.7 The
1. An act of the New Hampshire legislature empowered the Attorney General
of the state to act as a one-man investigating committee to ascertain if there were
persons located within the state who were defined by statute as "subversive."
N.H. Laws, ch. 197 (1955). See note 11 infra.
2. Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 130 A.2d 278 (1957).
3. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
4. Uphaus v. Wyman, 355 U.S. 16 (1957).
5. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
6. Wyman v. Uphaus, 101 N.H. 139, 136 A.2d 221 (1957).
7. Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground that the
rights of appellant of speech and those of assembly of the persons who attended
the camp could not be subordinated to the rights of the state of New Hampshire
because they could find no rational connection between the investigation and a
valid legislative purpose. Although the dissent was joined by Justices Black and
Douglas, they also concluded that the sentence of contempt, which grew out of
19601
